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ABSTRACT 
 
 
In recent years, for a variety of reasons,  there has been a resurgence of 
interest in „the region‟ from a variety of both intellectual and practical 
perspectives, with the somewhat surprising result that regional studies have 
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come to be of central concern and the region has come to occupy a central 
place in social scientific discourse and political debates. In this, questions of 
power loom large. In this paper I examine four, to a degree inter-weaving, sets 
of key questions, framed by a concern with who has the power of decision, in 
both intellectual debates about regions and regional policy and practice. First, 
how is the region to be defined? Secondly, how can the concept of 
governmentality deepen our understanding of regions? Thirdly, how are „the 
region‟s interests‟ to be defined? And finally, how is regional economic 
development to be defined? Problematising what we mean by the terms 
„region‟ and „development‟ in these ways and posing and exploring questions 
such as these will allow the study of regions to be taken forward in a 
progressive manner in the future. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in „the region‟ from a 
variety of both intellectual and practical perspectives, with the result that 
regional studies are once again of central concern. This re-emergence to 
centre stage has reflected a number of developments. On the one hand, from 
being consigned for many years to the murky margins of the history of 
geographical thought, somewhat surprisingly the region has come to occupy a 
central place in both social scientific discourse and political debates. At the 
same time as it has experienced a revived status in geography, the 
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significance of the region – and, more generally of the spatial constitution of 
economies and societies – came to be recognised as a critical issue in much 
of the social sciences: for example, in the core disciplines of economics 
(KRUGMAN, 2000), politics (KEATING et al, 2003) and sociology (URRY, 
1985) as well as in more applied areas of the social sciences such as 
business studies (for example, PORTER, 2003; SNOWDON and 
STONEHOUSE, 2006). Related to this, in the context of policy and practice, 
the region has become seen as a – even the – key territorial unit in an era of 
(neo)liberal globalisation, the “imagined unit of competition” (LOVERING, 1998, 
392), linked to a variety of measures to devolve responsibility for regional 
socio-economic development and well-being to the regional level. 
 
Not surprisingly, however, views have often differed quite sharply as to how 
best to think about the region and about the merits of a regional approach to 
issues of governance and economic development, both between and among 
politicians, citizens and intellectuals of various allegiances. For example, in 
June 2006 the citizens of Catalonia voted for a significant extension of powers 
to the regional (or as many of them would see it, Catalan national) scale in a 
further step in the evolution of asymmetric federalism in Spain. This in turn 
provoked a spate of similar demands in several other Spanish regions 
(Andalusia, the Balearic Islands, Galicia, and Valencia – the Basque country 
already had greater autonomy than Catalonia) which feared that they would 
lose out as a result of greater autonomy in Catalonia. At the same time, the 
Catalan vote generated fears from other, smaller regions, with weaker claims 
to historic nationhood (such as Castile and Aragon), that they would lose out 
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as the map of uneven socio-economic development within Spain became 
more sharply etched. In contrast, some eighteen months earlier in November 
2004 in north east England, a region with a long history of a certain sort of 
regionalist movement (see HUDSON, 2006a), though one grounded more in 
an economic definition of the region, especially in terms of state economic 
management, rather than a regional political identity per se, the population 
decisively rejected proposals for an elected Regional Assembly and an 
enhanced degree of devolution to the region. However, those voting against 
were something of an unholy alliance  –  some voted against because of 
opposition to greater devolution per se, others because they favoured 
devolution but felt that what was on offer was a weak and problematic set of 
proposals that would be inadequate to begin effectively to tackle the 
developmental problems of the region. Furthermore, there were genuine fears 
that the proposed Assembly would simply offer central government an excuse 
to lay the blame for the region‟s continuing problems on people in the region, 
a classic example of „blaming the victim‟. Which viewpoint was correct, both in 
north east England and the various Spanish regions (if indeed one can talk in 
those terms on such an issue), is not the point. The point is that „the region‟ 
had again become central to political debate, both as an object of state policy  
and as a putative subject shaping and implementing state policy but with 
sharply divergent views as to both the efficacy and indeed propriety of the 
region as both subject and object of policy. At the same time, however, there 
has been a (not so?) subtle change in language and the linguistic 
representation of the region: formerly “lagging” regions are re-cast as “under-
performing” or “challenged” (BOSANQUET et al, 2006), while the emphasis 
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has switched from addressing “social need” to re-dressing “economic under-
performance”. 
 
Similar divergences of view points and differences in emphasis are to be 
found amongst academics interested in regional issues and uneven 
development. In part, these can be related to exploration of a range of 
evolutionary and institutional perspectives on regions and regional 
development that have allowed more nuanced interpretations of the 
constitution of regions and regional development trajectories (for example, 
see AMIN, 1999; HUDSON, 2005; MARTIN and SUNLEY, 2006). In this, a 
variety of scholars have built upon the insights provided by Marxian political 
economy – in particular an understanding of the way in which regional uneven 
development is structurally and necessarily inscribed within capitalist 
development (HARVEY, 1982) so that capital constantly “see-saws” between 
regions in search of enhanced profits (SMITH, 1984) - to provide more subtle 
elaborations of the relationship between the trajectories of individual regions 
and the broader map of regional uneven  development and the processes 
through which the specificities of particular regions are constructed – an issue 
on which MASSEY‟s (1984) work was seminal.  
 
However, unsurprisingly, opening up this conceptual space has produced a 
variety of – sometimes competing - views rather than a consensus on one.  
For some, regions have become the key territorial units in an era of 
globalisation (for example, see SCOTT, 1998; STORPER, 1995), although, 
arguably, the focus on the region is being replaced by a revived interest in 
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city-regions as the pivotal territorial unit (see SCOTT and STORPER, 2003; 
OECD, 2006). In either case, however, the emphasis is placed firmly upon 
endogenous growth processes, regional institutions and regionally-specific 
knowledges and learning – in short, on what has been termed the Territorial 
Innovations Models perspective on regional development (MOULAERT and 
SEKIA, 2003). Often, however, such claims are seen to be based upon 
empirically insubstantial evidence (MARKUSEN, 1999). In contrast, others 
would dispute this alleged primacy of the region and, on theoretical as well as 
empirical grounds, insist that the national remains the key scale (for example, 
see PIKE and TOMANEY, 2004) and that the significance of the regions as a 
pivotal site of capital accumulation, economic growth and governance has 
been over-emphasised, as has been the significance of knowledge and 
learning (for example, see HUDSON, 1999). The issue is not that the region is 
– or has suddenly become – unimportant but rather that any prioritising of the 
region as the pivotal spatial scale and territorial unit should be based upon 
careful and theoretically grounded empirical research rather than sweeping 
arm waving assertion based upon thin empirics (although as I have argued 
elsewhere, it is important to recognise the varying qualitative as well as 
quantitative forms that valid evidence can take: see HUDSON, 2003). 
Certainly there are instances of regions that can seen as economically very 
successful  – at least for some of their residents - as, for example, the case of 
Spain reveals but this is a far cry from the assertion that because some 
regions are successful, all can be successful in a „win-win‟ world of bottom-up 
endogenous regional growth.  
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Associated with these differing views as to the centrality of the region to 
processes of economic growth and governance, there has been, again not 
surprisingly, some quite heated intellectual debate as to the most appropriate 
way to conceptualise regions and about the status of regions, both 
conceptually and politically. Often this has become polarised around 
competing either/or choices and two of these are of particular relevance. First, 
there are views of regions as closed, bounded and homogeneous entities that 
contrast with those of regions as open, permeable, and heterogeneous. 
Secondly, there are concepts of regions as objects of policy versus those of 
regions as subjects that influence, make and implement policy.  However, to 
see these only as either/or choices is counter-productive and would lead the 
study of regions and their development into a number of spacious, but 
ultimately unproductive, cul-de-sacs.  Rather than take an either/or 
perspective on these dichotomies, therefore, I argue that these must be seen 
from a both/and perspective, and that, crucially, which of these perspectives is 
chosen or given most weight depends – or at least should depend – upon the 
theoretical, political and practical contexts in which these choices are made. 
As such, they also depend upon issues of power and, more specifically, who 
has the power of decision in a number of key contexts.  
 
The concept of power is a tricky one, with a range of views as to how best to 
think about power. As I have recently discussed these issues elsewhere (for 
example, see HUDSON, 2006b) I will not repeat that discussion here, other 
than to say that, drawing on the work of ALLEN (2003, 2004), three concepts 
of power can be identified. These varying conceptions stress different aspects 
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of power and the processes through which it is constituted and produced so 
that different conceptions allow an illumination of different aspects of power 
and their relevance to regional issues. The first conception, drawing on critical 
realism, is a „centred‟ one of power as an inscribed capacity of individuals or 
institutions, which possess power by virtue of their constitutive social 
relationships and which they can exercise as „power over‟ others. The second 
conception of power is a „networked‟ conception. Power is conceived as a 
resource for achieving diverse ends, emphasising „power to‟ and the ways in 
which power is generated to achieve desired outcomes rather than how power 
constrains action. The third conception of power is Foucauldian and 
diagrammatic. Power is conceived as a technology - a series of strategies, 
techniques and practices - that works on subjects. It is exercised though 
groups or organisations rather than being held or possessed by them or 
centred in them. Power is conceptualised as fluid and relational, exercised 
from innumerable points within civil society, the economy and the state – thus 
many agencies and institutions are involved within productive networks of 
power rather than power being seen as resting only in the state and its 
agencies.  
 
While recognising the value of these different conceptions of power, ALLEN 
(2003) nonetheless sees them as inadequate and flawed in various ways. In 
particular, he argues that power is not a „thing‟ but rather must be understood 
as a relational effect of social interaction inseparable from its effects, 
expressed via diverse and specific modalities of power, each with its own 
particularities and specificities, constituted differently in time and space. He 
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identifies six modalities of power: domination; authority; seduction; coercion; 
manipulation; and inducement. However, these are analytic distinctions so 
that in practice they are combined in practical strategies and actions. In short, 
ALLEN regards existing conceptions of power as requiring refinement, 
particularly in terms of recognising distinctive modalities of power and their 
implications fro the exercise of power over space and through time, not least – 
as illustrated by his analyses of places such as the City of London and 
Potsdammer Platz in Berlin – in relation to the (re)production of regions. 
Equally , however, it is important to remember the sites – and structural 
relations – from which and through which these different modalities of power 
emanate ands are exercised.  
 
In the remainder of this paper I examine four, to a degree inter-weaving, sets 
of key questions in the context of a concern with who has the power of 
decision, in both intellectual debates and regional policy and practice. First, 
how is the region to be defined? Secondly, how can the concept of 
governmentality deepen our understanding of regions? Thirdly, how are „the 
region‟s interests‟ to be defined? And finally, how is regional economic 
development to be defined? Problematising what we mean by the terms 
„region‟ and „development‟ in these ways and posing and exploring questions 
such as these will allow the study of regions to be taken forward in a 
progressive manner in the future. 
 
Subject or object of policy: how and by whom is the region to be defined?  
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Broadly speaking, in policy discourses and academic commentaries upon and 
interpretations of these, regions have been seen as either the object or the 
subject of state policies, and sometimes as both simultaneously.  Although 
until recently the academic literature tended to focus upon regions as objects 
rather than subjects of policy, in fact there is  a long history of the practical 
construction of regions as subjects as well as objects of policy (for example, 
see HUDSON, 2006a). 
 
Typically, the construction of the region as an object of (national) state policy 
relies upon two processes. First, the demarcation of regional boundaries – the 
metaphorical drawing of lines on the ground that mark out the space of the 
region and/or the construction of material markers to denote, literally  „on the 
ground‟, where one region ends and another begins. Regions in this sense 
are literally “marked out” (cf. THRIFT, 2002). Secondly, the specification of a 
series of statistical indicators that allows the socio-economic profile of the 
region to be defined. Equally, these indicators allow changes in this profile, in 
the region‟s development and in the extent to which it is defined as 
„problematic‟ – as defined by these measures – to be assessed. As these are 
essentially central state policies for regions, such decisions about the drawing 
of boundaries, the definition of criteria against which regions are defined as 
problematic or not, and the monitoring of the state of regions against these 
criteria are taken (no doubt typically with some perfunctory consultation with 
relevant social actors in the regions) by central state ministries and agencies.  
In them rests the authority to assume this power of decision. While these may 
have administrative offices in the regions (as for example, with the post-1994 
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Government Offices of the Regions in England), the key decisions are 
typically taken by national government ministers and/or bureaucrats and civil 
servants in national capitals, located at varying distances from the regions 
affected by them and clearly distant from the peripheral regions that have the 
most serious developmental problems. Put in slightly different terms, this 
involves remote centres of calculation that monitor, discipline and govern 
regions „at a distance‟ (LATOUR, 1987) and on that basis reach decisions 
about policy measures and as to the resources and developmental aid that is 
to be allocated to different regions (issues discussed more fully in the 
following section).  
 
In part in response to this resurgence of political and popular interest in 
regions, there has, in recent years, undoubtedly been a growing emphasis in 
the social science literature on regional devolution as one part of more 
general processes of state “re-organisation” in many parts of the capitalist 
world (JESSOP, 1997).  Pressures for greater regional devolution „from below‟ 
have been generated by regionalist and nationalist movements, seeking to 
create more powerful sub-national spaces of governance and regulation within 
the boundaries of national states or – indeed – to create new national spaces. 
This can involve challenges from within regions to the authority of central 
government and to existing regional boundaries, and/or challenges over the 
criteria used to define regions, and/or challenges as to the existing order in 
terms of who has the power to decide matters of regional interest and 
concern. However, while there may have been „bottom up‟ pressures from 
within regions, in part a consequence of the powers of seduction and the 
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promise of greater regional autonomy, national states have not been innocent 
and passive by-standers in these processes of territorial decentralisation of 
power and/or responsibilities. For example, states may seek to preserve the 
integrity of their national territory via granting increased autonomy to regions 
within their boundaries or seek to contain fiscal crises by devolving responsibility 
(but not commensurate resources) for economic development to regions. While 
there may well be political and social forces within regions arguing fro greater 
devolution to them, it is important to acknowledge that regional devolution can 
have negative as well as positive economic effects. Decentralisation can impose 
economic costs in the form of efficiency disadvantages, equity-related 
drawbacks and institutional burdens. Furthermore, many of the 
disadvantageous effects are contingent upon which actors are driving 
devolutionary policies and, as a result, the specific from that devolution takes.  
(RODRIGUES-POSE and GILL, 2005). 
 
These varied pressures for devolution have certainly reinforced or even, in some 
cases, initiated tendencies to shift regulatory practices from the national level 
and so qualitatively change relationships between national and regional levels. It 
is, however, important not to overstate the extent of such changes. There is a 
long-established sub-national territorial structure to state power in many 
capitalist states in response to requirements for administrative efficiency and 
political legitimacy, to say nothing of smooth accumulation. There are clear 
examples demonstrating that the power to shape policies for regions has been 
shifted more to the regional level – as in Spain – with greater decentralisation, to 
some regions at least, of the power to decide and of the resources to implement 
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decisions. Rather than regions simply administering central government policies, 
regions construct and implement their own policies. This is intended to produce 
a greater correspondence between administrative spaces and the meaningful 
spaces of the regional life world, albeit with regional boundaries determined in 
the last analysis by central states. As a result, more complex architectures of 
political power and spaces of governing have emerged. However, again, it is 
important not to overstate the extent to which the “power to decide” and 
commensurate resources have been devolved to regions as opposed to the 
regional scale remaining one of importance for the administration of national 
policies for the regions. It is worth emphasising that regional devolution involves 
relative shifts in responsibility and power of decision and that these are heavily 
circumscribed precisely because national states retain their authority and the 
power to make decisions as the extent and form of devolution.  
 
As well as such scalar shifts, there has also often been a re-definition of the 
boundaries of state activities associated with a change in emphasis from 
government to governance in systems of governing. Regulatory capacities have 
been shifted "outwards" to non-state or „quasi-state‟ organisations with 
enhanced significance placed upon social practices beyond the state. A range of 
organisations and institutions within civil society has been incorporated into 
processes of governance. This has been particularly associated with the 
promotion of network concepts and networked forms of regional governance 
(HADJIMICHALIS and HUDSON, 2006). The growing emphasis on governance 
is recognition of the increasing importance - or perhaps more accurately is 
increasing recognition of the importance - of the institutions of civil society in 
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securing the conditions under which the (regional) economy is possible. The 
growing emphasis upon regionally networked forms of governance is grounded 
in a (typically tacit) assumption that networked forms of power at the regional 
scale are adequate to deal with the structural power of capital and to resolve 
regional development issues.  
 
In summary, then, the key issue is not so much the rise of the region and the 
decline of the national state but rather the new forms of relationships between 
national and regional. Integral to the reorganisation of the national state is the 
emergence of new, more complicated structures of governing, involving re-
defined relations between economy, society and state and complex links within 
multi-scalar systems of governing. As LOVERING (1998, 392) acerbically notes, 
however, “the apparent resurgence of the region makes less sense as a 
phoenix-like re-emergence of regional economic crucibles than as the effect of 
top-down policies to replace the „imagined community‟ at the national level with 
an „imagined unit of competition‟ at the regional level”. However, despite the 
emergence of such new imaginaries, in practice national states are not eclipsed 
by resurgent regions and retain a key role as “scale managers”, shaping 
decisions about scalar shifts in regulatory capacity, serving as authoritative 
centres of both calculation and persuasion, performing as authors of narratives 
about change and reform and as centres of interpretation and dissemination of 
knowledge about experiences elsewhere (PECK, 2003, 357).  The critical issue 
is not the demise but the character of the national state, the dominant modalities 
through which it continues to exercise power, the type of regulatory régime that 
it maintains, the geometry of that régime and the extent to which it involves 
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devolution to the regional scale, and the form of capitalist economy that it seeks 
to encourage.  
 
Regions and governmentality 
 
The Foucauldian concept of governmentality (for example, see FOUCAULT, 
1991; DEAN, 1999) further illuminates the processes of reorganising the state 
and attempts to create the region as a political subject and the regional as a 
new – or perhaps more accurately re-defined - scale of governing. While the 
emphasis on the national as the dominant space and spatial scale of 
regulation can be seen as expressive of one governmentality and ensemble of 
varying modalities of power, the shift to concepts of multi-level governance 
and of re-defined boundaries between economy, civil society and state in the 
processes of governing can be seen as both indicative and constitutive of an 
alternative governmentality and combination of modalities. Not least, the 
spatial object of policy and the spaces of governing are seen to encompass 
more than just the national. Acknowledging this, however – as exemplified by 
the cases of Spain and the UK described in the introductory section – the shift 
towards regions as modes and scales of governing remains contested, partial 
and uneven in its development. 
 
By conjoining „government‟ and „mentality‟ in a productive alliance, 
governmentality therefore emphasises the practical „how‟ of governing and the 
structures of government and governing, the way in which the thought 
involved in the practices of government is collective and relatively taken-for-
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granted, usually not open to questioning by its practitionersi. The existing 
order becomes naturalised and as such is not open for discussion. More 
specifically, in the context of state policies and the governing of regions “at a 
distance”, governmentality “is intrinsically linked to the activities of expertise” 
(MACKINNON, 2000, 296) and the authority that this provides. The purpose 
of deploying expertise is to enact “assorted attempts at the calculated 
administration of diverse aspects of conduct through the countless, often 
competing, local tactics of education, persuasion, inducement, management, 
incitement, motivation and encouragement” rather than to seek to weave “an 
all-pervasive web of „social control‟”. Moreover, space is an important element 
of governmentality, precisely because such governmental activities are 
territorially-demarcated. For in order to “to govern it is necessary to render 
visible the space over which government is to be exercised. And this is not 
simply a matter of looking: space has to be re-presented, marked out” 
(THRIFT, 2002, 205), emphasising that regions need to be defined, 
represented and their boundaries (literally or metaphorically) marked out, as 
both objects and subjects of governing.  
 
This focuses attention upon those with the power to define and represent in 
these ways. Rather than unquestioningly accept the claims of those who 
assert their right to speak for the region, the spotlight is turned on their 
activities, the modalities of power that they deploy in pursuit of this right – 
manipulation and coercion as much as, if not more than, authority and 
domination – and the basis on which they claim the right to act in this way 
problematises. In short, the black box of the region is opened up in order to 
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explain how it can perform as a political subject with shared regional interests 
via uncovering the bases of the formation of a dominant or hegemonic 
regional bloc.  The creation of such a cohesive regional bloc is a result of the 
successful realisation of specific regional projects that unite diverse social 
actors, with otherwise differing or competing interests, around a distinct line of 
action that becomes defined as the regional interest. However, achieving such 
unity is always a contingent matter. As such, unity is always provisional. Even 
if unity is achieved and maintained for a time, however, there is no guarantee 
that such projects will always and only have their intended effects precisely 
because of the inability to anticipate the emergent properties of practices.  
 
The concept of governmentality has several further significant consequences 
relating to issues of regions, regional policies and regional devolution. The 
first relates to the constitution of the objects, subjects and spaces of 
government. For example, regional economies are constituted via regional 
statistics, which have a key role in „making economies visible‟ and constituting 
them as objects for policy action. The capability to decide upon these defining 
statistical measures is clearly a critical issue. Secondly, LATOUR (1987, 237-
40) emphasises the key role of “centres of calculation”, critical nodes in which 
information on distant objects is brought together, compared, combined, and 
aggregated via use of mathematical and statistical techniques, thereby 
enabling government to ”act at a distance” on objects, such as regions, 
through its programmes and policies. Put slightly differently, “through a 
process of mobilization, the truth claims of accredited authority figures, under 
the guise of neutrality and efficiency, set out the norms of conduct that enable 
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distant events and people to be governed at arms‟ length” (ALLEN, 2003, 
141). Thirdly, it highlights “the specific mechanisms, procedures and tactics 
assembled and deployed as particular programmes are materialised” 
(MACKINNON, 2000, 295) and through which governmental programmes are 
activated and put into practice. Particular techniques and practices become 
governmental because they can be made practical, transformed into concrete 
devices for managing and directing reality. Inscription (for example, writing 
down agreed quantitative targets for regional economic growth) and 
calculation are key technologies, “responsibilising” and disciplining actors to 
the claims of central authority (ROSE, 1996). These technologies render 
reality – and in this particular context, regions - “stable, mobile, comparable, 
combinable”, enabling government to act on it (ROSE, and MILLER, 1992, 
185).  
 
Such moves are not unproblematic, theoretically or practically, however. For 
example, there is a danger that a governmental perspective encourages a 
view of power as all-pervasive, found everywhere, expressed via a seemingly 
infinite variety of practices and techniques, such that any sense of hierarchy 
or structure in terms of the relative importance of different sources of power 
slips from view. Furthermore, there are tensions between decentralisation to 
regions and the development of new managerial technologies at national level 
to steer the activities of regional agencies and ensure that they deliver 
national policy objectives. Regional spaces become simultaneously objects 
and subjects of national government, and via “the combination of flexibility 
and standardisation (that is, different levels, same targets) … gives 
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governmental technologies their utility as instruments for managing space” 
(MacKinnon, 2000, 309). However, there is no guarantee that targets will be 
attained (witness the continuing problematic status of many peripheral 
regions). Moreover, granting a degree of autonomy to enable regions to 
become political subjects also creates the possibility of forming enclosures, 
tightly bound sites of vigorously defended professional expertise that are 
resistant to the wishes of government (ROSE and MILLER, 1991). Thus an 
unintended consequence of empowering experts “in and for” regions may be 
to create the capacity to resist the intentions of central government towards 
those regions as objects of its policies. There may well be irreconcilable 
differences between “authority voices” (O‟MALLEY, 2000), the „experts‟ 
enrolled  by national and regional organisations, respectively. Equally, it may 
create capacity, or at least the space in which such capacity might emerge 
and evolve, for the elaboration – although not necessarily the implementation 
- of alternative regional projects, indicative of the more general contradictory 
tendencies that plague state policies. However, such creative capacity may 
well be lacking of fail to emerge in the space created for it, especially in those 
regions that have a history of economic decline and selective put-migration of 
their most talented residents. As a result of this, and institutional sclerosis, 
there may well be a lack of research capacity to analyse and interpret 
developmental tendencies and design context-specific policies that best suit 
the situation of specific regions in the face of these broader forces, even when 
given the chance to do so (for example, see OECD, 2006). As a result, 
regions – or, more precisely, key actors in government departments and 
organisations and related development bodies drawn from the cast of „usual 
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suspects‟ - often fall back upon a limited set of consultants and “experts”, who 
are seen as the sole repositories of authoritative and relevant knowledge,  to 
produce strategies that see all regions, irrespective of their varied conditions 
and histories, as seeking to mimic “the global leaders” or to grow more rapidly 
than the national average while pursuing generically similar policies and 
practices 
 
How are we to conceptualise the processes through which „the region‟ and 
„the region‟s interests‟ are constructed? 
 
In the previous section, I emphasised that the construction of a region as a 
socio-material ensemble and of a „regional interest‟ is always, necessarily, 
provisional, precisely because it is the product of a social process. Indeed, 
this process may well involve conflict and differing views and, as JESSOP 
(1990) emphasises, objects (and one might add, subjects) of regulation are 
not fully constitutes prior to the struggles over their regularisation but are 
partially constituted through them. Essentialist conceptions of regions are no 
longer intellectually tenable. Regions are not „out there‟ waiting to be 
discovered. They are socially constructed, both discursively and materially, in 
relation to specific criteria. However, it is important to acknowledge that 
political actors and particular interest groups may seek to define and defend 
regions in essentialist terms and it is important to understand why this is so, 
and this is relevant in relation to arguments about regions and regional 
development. Not least, the claim that regions can and should become active 
subjects rather than passive objects of policy often rests on assertions as to 
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some essential regional (or national) identity, often mobilised around some 
perceived injustice or inequality. 
 
This recent re-thinking of the region is predicated upon a strongly relational 
approach. Regions are seen as constituted from spatialised social relations, 
stretched out over space and materialised in various forms, and also through 
representational narratives about them (for example, see AMIN, 2004). The 
spatiality of the dynamics of capitalism, the uneven geographies of its  
mechanisms of growth and decline and the stories told about them, represent 
one way of conceptualising the processes underlying the (re)construction of 
regions. Regions can be seen as products of complex condensations of social 
relationships, of varying density and variety, which combine contingently in 
specific time/space couplings to produce what are, in the last analysis, unique 
regions but regions with fuzzy and permeable boundaries. The simultaneous 
combined and uneven development of particular regions reflects a shifting 
engagement with mechanisms of growth and decline as these are stretched 
over space in the flux of real historical time (HARVEY, 1982). 
 
This relational approach therefore provides a way of thinking that challenges 
the view of the region as a coherent bounded territorial entity and discloses a 
region which is by no means necessarily a whole, with the characteristics of 
coherence which that term implies; nor is it necessarily a bounded and closed 
entity. Thinking about a region in terms of stretched out social relationships 
reveals a complex and unbounded lattice of articulations constructed through 
and around relations of power and inequality. It is a discontinuous lattice, 
  22 
punctured by structured exclusions, with intra-regional variation “because of 
the uneven nature of the overlay of different [defining] criteria” (ALLEN et al., 
1998, 55-6). While the region becomes the nexus of a variety of social 
relationships and of modalities of power, the spatial reach of these 
relationships differs and therefore there can be no presumption that regional 
boundaries defined on the basis of different criteria will coincide. Each 
relational network has its own spatial reach, but while these may not be 
coincident, they may nonetheless mutually influence one another. Intra-
regional heterogeneity and discontinuity implies that, metaphorically, the 
fabric of regions is torn and ragged.  Consequently, the issue is not how and 
whether to draw lines around regions but to seek to understand the processes 
through which they are (re)produced (HUDSON, 1990).  
 
There is no doubt that thinking about regions in these relational terms is 
productive. However, ALLEN et al. (1998, 143) have gone further and claimed 
that an adequate understanding of regions can “only” come about through 
conceptualising them as open, discontinuous, relational and internally diverse, 
thereby dismissing the notion of regions as bounded territories and 
suggesting that the territorial and the relational are either/or conceptionsii. 
There is undoubtedly ample empirical evidence that, on average, the 
frequency, intensity and spatial reach of such extra-regional connections have 
tended to increase as the social relationships of capitalism have become 
more stretched and re-defined spaces in new ways. However, the density and 
geography of linkages can decline as well as increase in particular regions – 
for example, because of devalorisation and disinvestment decisions by 
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transnational companies or political decisions to seek a greater degree of 
regional closure precisely because of the character of extra-regional relations, 
linkages and distanciated network relationships and the risks that these are 
seen to pose to the economic and social life of the region. Indeed recent 
research (see PIKE et al, 2006) has suggested that emphasising openness 
and connectivity as essential pre-requisites for regional economic growth may 
lead to problems of leakage, dispersal and structural incoherence in regional 
economies, thereby – albeit unintentionally – undermining their viability. 
Recognising these risks, social and political actors often seek to increase the 
extent of regional closure and represent regions as closed, continuous and 
internally homogeneous and, as such, more viable policy objects and 
legitimate subjects seeking to shape policy. Consequently, while many of the 
social relations that help constitute regions traverse their immanent 
boundaries and enrol extra-regional actors in the process of regionalisation, 
these trans-boundary relationships may, in some cases, to help produce 
coherent bounded regions and what may be termed “closure” (see also 
HUDSON, 2001, Chapter 8). The spatial extent of the territories to be 
enclosed can vary with context and purpose so that a scalar hierarchy of 
territories (generically, sub0national, national, and supra-national) may and, 
characteristically, often does emerge as a result. 
 
Thus in contrast to ALLEN et al (1998) I would argue that the relational and 
the (hierarchically scalar) territorial can be seen as both/and rather than 
either/or conceptions, and that „territorially embedded‟ and „relational and 
unbounded‟ conceptions of regions are complementary alternatives, and that 
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actually existing regions are a product of a struggle and tension between 
territorialising and de-territorialising processes.  Depending upon the 
circumstances and the specific situation of particular regions, policy and 
politics may be informed by a bounded territorial and hierarchical conception 
or by a relational conception that emphasises a flat ontology of networked 
connections as the more appropriate perspective from which to view the 
region.. 
 
How is regional economic development to be defined? 
 
For much of the time and for many people, the definition of regional economic 
development is a non-issue: the meaning and substance of „the economy‟ is 
seen as self-evident. The development of a regional economy is defined by 
growth in output, especially productivity and output per caput, and if this is 
accompanied by some growth in employment, so much the better. However, 
the key indicators of development are output and productivity – or in other 
words, regional economic development is defined as regional economic 
growth, and growth in the formal mainstream economy at that. There is 
nothing inherently „wrong‟ with such a definition but it does severely 
circumscribe thinking about, and the definitions of, both „economy‟ and 
„development‟. Given this rather emaciated and limited mainstream definition 
of economic development, it is important to recognise that many regions are 
doomed to under-perform against centrally-set targets and in relation to 
national growth rates. Uneven development is an integral component of 
capitalist economies and while some regions will exceed national (or other) 
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growth rates and targets, others will not. In other words some will „fail‟ as part 
of the price of others „succeeding‟. Consequently, there is no „win-win‟ neo-
liberal golden age leading to regional convergence, let alone even 
development 
 
Furthermore, the mainstream view pays scant, if any, attention to issues of 
consumption, living conditions and lifestyle and to distributional issues as 
central to development, and there are strong grounds for arguing that issues 
of social and environmental justice and equity must be central to any 
sustainable economic development strategy. Indeed, issues such as quality of 
food ad life, linked to regionalised supply chains, are finding their way onto the 
developmental agenda as part of alternative “bottom up” approaches to 
development policy in several parts of Europe (HADJIMICHALIS and 
HUDSON, 2007). Such shifts in thinking are important because even in those 
successful regions – not least the „superstar‟ regions (PERRONS, 2004, 202-
37) - that are deemed to have „succeeded‟, there are issues of intra-regional 
inequality, poverty, and  poor living and environmental conditions as a 
consequence of the inequitable distributions of the „goods‟ and „bads‟ that are 
integral to the practices of the capitalist economy (for example, see MASSEY, 
2006). This emphasises that regions, both in general and in relation to 
particular regions, are amenable to multiple simultaneous representation, as 
both “winners” and “losers”, “successful” and “failing”, depending upon the 
audience, context and purpose. 
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Moreover, the mainstream view defines substantial swathes of socially-useful 
activity that can be summarised under rubrics such as the social economy, or 
Third Sector, as irrelevant to the development debate. Defining „development‟ 
in terms of GDP/caput and productivity in the mainstream economy squeezes 
out consideration of a range of social economy approaches, from „near 
market‟ social enterprises to more traditional voluntary sector charities that 
have the capacity to create socially useful work, producing socially useful 
products and services, but within metrics other than those of the mainstream 
economy. While surpluses may be produced, they do not become profits – 
they may be expressed in metrics such as units of time, for example, or 
distributed via non-monetary exchange. Eliminating such activities from the 
definition of „economy‟ is a quite critical manoeuvre as such activities are 
often proportionally of greater importance in regions that have become 
peripheral to the main circuits of capital accumulation and the mainstream 
economy. It is, therefore, important that the economy be re-thought to include 
rather than exclude them and for regional development policy to reflect this 
movement. Put another way, re-thinking “the economy” in these ways 
foregrounds the central political question of “who counts in the economy?” 
 
There is some evidence of exploring such policy solutions and conceptions  
but, typically, very much as a last resort, part of a politics of despair to be tried 
only when all else has failed in problem regions. Often such moves reflect 
deep concern by national (and to a degree in the EU, supra-national quasi-) 
states to legitimate their own position by being seen to act (if not care), of 
having tried the mainstream solutions and found them seriously wanting, to be 
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open to new and different policy approaches, rather than expressing a 
genuine commitment to exploring alternative paths and trajectories to those of 
the mainstream economy and conceptions of development. Moreover, the 
impoverished condition of these regions militates against the development of 
a vibrant social economy there, even more so if this is seen as a subversive 
development, undermining the mainstream.  
 
As well as re-thinking the economy in these ways, there is also a need to re-
think development so as, for example, to give much more weight to questions 
of distribution and equity and issues such as health and well-being (PIKE et 
al, this issue). Not least, this helps recover consideration of the question of 
what the economy is for, what its social purposes are and ought to be, what 
values and principles inform and underlie conceptions of development, rather 
than there being a one-dimensional concern with growth per se. This in turn 
could, for example, encompass a greater sensitivity to issues of 
environmental and social justice and sustainability as central to the regional 
developmental agendaiii. Put another way, re-thinking “development” in these 
ways foregrounds the central political questions of “development for whom?” – 
a question rendered more complex and slippery as a result of recognition of 
the multiple and shifting identities of individuals -, of ”whose values and 
principles shape the dominant conceptions of development and how do they 
do so?”  and “through which modalities of power are these dominant 
conceptions established and secured?”. 
 
Recognising the limits to the region and the regional 
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Creating the space for these re-thought and revised conceptions of region, 
economy and development to become the basis of new forms of regional 
policies and practice will certainly require a parallel radical re-thinking of 
appropriate forms of politics and a thorough critique of the modalities of power 
through which they are practised. The „old‟ models of representative 
democracy certainly remain relevant but there is a pressing need both to re-
vamp them and to build upon and go beyond them. This would involve – inter 
alia - exploring more participatory forms of democratic practice and opening 
up more open and transparent fora for political decision making beyond as 
well as within the formal structures of party politics. In many regions, 
especially those blighted by economic decline and characterised by a degree 
of introspection and political conservatism, this may prove the biggest 
challenge of all. The dominance of politics and policy decision making by „the 
usual suspects‟, those familiar but shadowy dominant figures in both public 
and private sectors (typically male, middle-aged and grey-suited) who 
regularly appear as the decisive actors who reach the key decisions behind 
closed doors and who pursue their interests via coercion, inducement and 
manipulation as well as appeals to that more visible authority, needs to be 
broken (for example, see ROBINSON et al, 2000). 
 
While recognising the positive developmental potential that may, therefore,  
be embodied in a „regional‟ approach to development, it is equally important to  
recognise the limits to the regional, and insist that the national state continues 
to acknowledge its responsibilities for the social and economic well-being of 
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its citizens, wherever they live. For example, as RODRIGUEZ–POSE and 
GILL (2004, 2115) conclude, “(regional) devolution per se will …not deliver 
greater territorial equity. This objective would require the establishment of 
substantial interterritorial fiscal equalisation systems at the national or 
supranational level if the persistence and permanence of economic disparities 
are not to become one of the hallmarks of future geographies”. More 
generally, the national state remains pivotal and often decisive in shaping the 
character and extent of sub-national governance and economic and social 
development (PIKE and TOMANEY, 2004, 2093). Acknowledging the force of 
this point, however, it is equally important to stress that the state apparatus 
cannot be simply and non-problematically „captured‟ to address the needs of 
the mass of the population of peripheralised regions. The key issues then 
become the architecture of the system of governing, the social bases of power 
and its distribution, and the modalities of the power relations between the 
regional and national within, but also beyond, the structures of the state.  
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly of all, it is vital that re-thinking of the 
region acknowledges and seeks to deal with two messy but vital political 
realities. First, the enduring dilemmas of seeking to pursue simultaneously a 
politics of recognition that recognises respects the legitimacy of regional 
identities and peoples‟ identification with “their region” and one of 
redistribution that seeks to reduce, if not eliminate, material disparities in 
economic well-being and living conditions between regions (see Fraser, 
1995). Secondly, that this re-thinking escapes the myth of a unified (and 
unifying) regional interest and explicitly acknowledges the existence different - 
  30 
and at times openly competitive, grounded in different class structural 
positions and other sources of social power – interests held by individuals and 
social groups living in the same space. Within such an agonistic politics, 
which interests prevail and which are prioritised in state policy agendas would 
be seen as the outcome of overtly political struggle based on a recognition of 
legitimate (or at least legally sanctioned) difference – often grounded in 
structurally asymmetrical power relations - rather than a presumption of 
homogeneity of interest on the basis of a shared regional identity. Recognition 
of this emphasises that progress towards greater territorial justice would need 
to unpack the modalities of power that underwrite existing injustices and 
grapple with more complex spatialities than simply those of inter-regional 
relations.  
 
In this context it is worth noting the radical experiments in “participatory 
budgeting” that originated in Porto Alegre in Brazil in the late 1980s and 
subsequently diffused to other locations, including several in Europe (see 
HADJIMICHALIS and HUDSON, 2007). Via this process of radical re-
definition of the democratic involvement,  citizens are actively involved in the 
decision-making processes that shapew the regions in which they live. 
 
Conclusions? 
 
„Conclusions‟ is perhaps rather too grand a term so let me simply end by 
saying that it seems to me that in thinking about the future of studies of the  
region and regional development, these are some of the sorts of issues that 
  31 
critical social scientists need to focus upon. But because these are issues that 
reach into the fabric of daily life for many people, especially those in those 
regions designated as „peripheral‟ – indeed even „ultra-peripheral‟, such as 
the Azores and Canaries in the EU (EURISLES, 2002) -  they have a 
significance that reaches far beyond the realms of the academy and academic 
debate. Above all, they are – and need to be seen as – political issues that, 
moreover, often raise quite profound questions about modalities of power, the 
nature of politics and the political process itself. On the one hand, regions and 
the people resident in them have typically been seen as both subjects 
vulnerable to the whim of capital‟s (dis)investment decisions and as the 
objects of state policies that, ostensibly at least, were intended to counter the 
worst effects of capital flight and place specific devalorisation. On the other 
hand, moves to decentralise responsibility – and maybe even power and 
resources, or perhaps more accurately, as ALLEN (2003) would have it, the 
effects of power that resources of various sorts enable – to regions to allow 
people there better to formulate their own socio-economic development 
strategies typically presume the existence of a shared regional interest – 
which is rarely if ever a valid assumption – and run the risk that the blame for 
continuing socio-economic development problems will thereby be shifted to 
the region and its inhabitants. What is needed is a rather different model and 
understanding of politics and practice that recognises that simply living in the 
same region does not confer identity of interest but also that in many regions 
the regional capacity to shift regional development trajectories onto a „higher 
and better‟ path is strictly limited precisely because of their location within the 
structural relations of capitalist development. . 
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As a result, there is an enduring need for the analytic perspectives of political 
economy that emphasise the systemic character of regional uneven 
development in order better to understand these limits. Equally, there needs 
to be a multi-scalar policy response that conjoins regional, national and supra-
national state policies in an intelligent way and that maybe also links these 
polices to the activities of a range of non-state organisations to address 
problems in specific regions. In turn, such a shift of policy and practice 
requires a conceptualisation of regions as social and material constructions, 
as path-dependent but always provisional and emergent rather than final, as 
encompassing variety and heterogeneity of interest, and as necessarily open 
and linked to other regions. Without falling into the trap of equating path 
dependency with a deterministic iron law of history, it is important to recognise 
that historical legacies are important and that path dependency constrains – if 
not determines – the future developmental possibilities of regions. In short, 
moving towards a more even map of regional development will be – at best – 
a long drawn out process, characterised by at least as many steps backwards 
and sideways as forwards in the search for a politics that both recognises and 
respects the right to regional identity and specificity while seeking to redress 
the material inequalities of regional uneven development and wrestles with 
the dilemmas of seeking to deal simultaneously with issues of recognition and 
redistribution (cf. FRASER, 1995). 
 
Indeed, recognising these enduring dilemmas, it is important to emphasise 
that there is not a single “high road” to which there is no alternative and to 
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which all must aspire – and so strive and compete for the resources seen as 
essential to attaining this goal. Arguments that this is the case, that there is no 
alternative, need to be vigorously contested. Certainly there are limits that are 
an unavoidable consequence of the dominance of capitalist social relations – 
and in this sense very limited scope for transformatory as opposed to 
affirmative political strategies (FRASER, 1995) - but this does not mean that 
there are no possibilities for political choices within these parameters. So, in 
contrast, and instead of deterministic inevitability, the emphasis should be 
placed firmly upon political choice and the political possibilities offered by 
recognition of multiple paths and developmental trajectories and modalities of 
power, upon the potential for context-dependent and sensitive policies that 
acknowledge both varying historical trajectories and the constraints and 
possibilities that these present to future development, and upon the varying 
aspirations and goals of regional residents.  
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i
 There are clear resonances here with the doxic qualities of Bourdieu‟s (1977) concept of 
habitus and Gramsci‟s (1971) concept of hegemony.   
ii
 Although see ALLEN (2003), 172-4) for a more qualified view on the issue of closure and 
boundaries.  
iii
 Clearly, there are major debates as to the precise meaning of contested terms such as 
sustainability and environmental and social justice but it is sufficient here simply to note that 
these are issues that need to be considered in thinking about development alongside 
narrower concerns with economic efficiency, productivity and growth rates.  
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